Blackhawk expert identifies several troubling details about the American Airlines/Blackhawk crash that killed 67 in DC

WASHINGTON, DC - Last week, a tragic event unfolded before the eyes of the nation. A midair collision between a passenger plane and an Army helicopter over the Potomac River in Washington, D.C. left us all in shock. The video of the crash, capturing American Airlines Flight 5342 on its final approach to runway 33 at Reagan National Airport in Alexandria, Virginia, moments away from a safe landing, being struck by an Army Blackhawk helicopter, was a harrowing sight. The disbelief of those watching was palpable as they tried to comprehend how such a catastrophe could occur. 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will spend the next several weeks (or even months) sorting through evidence, reviewing air traffic control audio, radar images, and the “black boxes”—flight data and voice recorders–from the American Airlines aircraft and the Army helicopter. It will also review air traffic control tower staffing and make overall recommendations.

The Pentagon, meanwhile, will examine Army operations in the DC corridor to identify any shortcomings, while also examining the records of the Blackhawk crew. None of that, however, will bring back the 64 passengers and crew on the airliner or the three Army service members in the Blackhawk. 

What we know is that flight 5342 was initially cleared to land on runway one but then was asked if they could take runway 33, which was accepted. To land on runway 33, American 5342 had to jog over to the right side of the Potomac to line up for 33. The Blackhawk was traveling on a designated "helicopter route" along the Potomac, a specific path for helicopter flights, and was supposed to remain at or below 200 feet AGL (above ground level).

Just after American 5342 completed its turn toward the runway, it was struck by the helicopter, with both aircraft plunging into the Potomac, killing all on board both. 

Radio talk show host Wayne Allyn Root has a longtime friend, “Colonel Joe,” an experienced pilot and crew chief on the Blackhawk. He provides valuable insights into the potential causes of the accident, as reported in The Gateway Pundit. 

“The single greatest error in this accident was the decision to fly without a second crew chief on the left-hand side of the Blackhawk, who could have provided an extra set of eyes to ‘look out-and-up’ to see the approaching American Airlines passenger plane.” Now, in fairness, it is unknown at this point where the crew chief was sitting in the back of the Blackhawk, but Colonel Joe’s assessment seems to make sense given the apparent lack of situational awareness on the left side of the Blackhawk. 

“Night vision goggle (NVG) flights result in a sort of ‘tunnel vision’ for all who wear the NVGs, and normal policy in many Army flight units is to force a full crew of two pilots and two crew chiefs for all NVG flights so that you always have ‘eyes out’ on both sides of the aircraft when flying in those conditions,” Colonel Joe told Root. 

“While not mandatory, it is the proper safety call, especially when flying in the vicinity of a busy, major airport such as Reagan [National] Airport (DCA). No matter how competent the pilots and crew chiefs may be, this flight needed a second crew chief on the left side of the chopper.” 

Again, it is not known (or at least public information) where the crew chief was sitting, and this could be determined based on where he was recovered from by FBI divers. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and the head of the Army will likely have existing policies reexamined to ensure that shortcoming is addressed. 

Colonel Joe said that even if the pilot had not worn night vision goggles, his vision would have been limited out the left door. The pilot could also have been distracted by radio calls or referencing GPS, tasks that could have consumed him inside the cockpit instead of outside the helicopter. 

“Flight Unit Leadership failed to recognize the need for a second crew chief in the Mission Planning and Risk Assessment Process. This is where either incompetence or DEI (or both) may have come into play. This was certainly poor leadership,” Colonel Joe told Root. 

“Known mistakes by the Blackhawk flight crew point to a lack of experience and/or competence. We’ve heard in the media that both pilots were ‘experienced.’ This is just not true. Someone is ‘blowing smoke’ to the media, to President Trump, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, to ‘cover their ass,’ Colonel Joe said.

“The collective experience of the pilots was not impressive. Their level of experience is like comparing a rookie in the NFL to a second-year player. The pilot had the experience of a second-year player, while the co-pilot was a rookie. This was NOT an experienced crew to be flying at night, near a major airport, without a second crew chief.” 

The Army identified the pilot of the Blackhawk as Staff Sgt. Ryan O’Hara, 28, of Lilburn, Georgia. Jonathan Koziol, a retired Army chief warrant officer attached to the Unified Command Post at Reagan National, told reporters that O’Hara had over 1,000 hours of flight time, although the amount in the Blackhawk was not noted. The co-pilot, who had over 500 hours of flight time, was identified as Capt. Rebecca Lobach, 28, of Durham, North Carolina. Finally, the chief warrant officer was identified as Andrew Eaves, 39, of Great Mills, Maryland. 

Colonel Joe told Root several details about the crash that stood out to him. For example, he noted that radio calls were not responded to by the Blackhawk crew (audio of communications between the tower and the Blackhawk seem to dispute that, with the helicopter acknowledging that he had “the CRJ in sight.” The tower had instructed the Blackhawk to go “behind the CRJ.” Some observers believe the Blackhawk was looking at the wrong aircraft. 

Colonel Joe also noted the Blackhawk was “350 feet above ground level (AGL), whereas reports say they were supposed to fly at 200 feet AGL. These two mistakes alone show that the crew were not as experienced or professional as reported to President Trump, Defense Secretary Hegseth, or the media.

“The instructor pilot may have been too inexperienced for this ‘annual evaluation’ flight, as mistakes were clearly made during the course of the flight (that are assumed to have been made by the junior pilot being evaluated). Why didn’t the instructor pilot notice they were flying too high and off course? That points to his lack of experience. If there had been a second crew chief, he could have noticed these mistakes and warned the pilots,” he said. 

Colonel Joe also told Root that some blame may also be appropriate for flight unit commanders, noting that the battalion commander of the 12th Aviation Unit “was the first leader in the chain of events for the Mission Plan and Risk Assessment to get signed off and approved.” He questioned why that battalion commander didn’t have a second crew chief assigned to the Blackhawk. 

“Accident sequences for these types of accidents begin in ‘Mission Planning,’ when first selecting the time you will fly, where you will fly for the Annual Evaluation, and what crew members will be on the flight. Any of the leaders in that unit’s chain of command could have demanded that this flight have two crew chiefs aboard the aircraft due to NVG flying conditions, plus the busy airspace of Reagan Airport.

“An experienced, thoughtful leader knows when to ‘raise the standard’ and force the mission to have that second crew chief aboard the aircraft,’ Colonel Joe told Root. “This was clearly one of those moments, and both the B Company Commander and the 12th Aviation Battalion Commander failed to see through this risk problem and impose their own ‘risk reduction’ to include a second crew chief to manage the left-hand side of the Blackhawk.” 

Colonel Joe told Root that, despite the other mistakes that were apparently made, the presence of a second crew chief on the left side of the Blackhawk may have prevented the disaster. 

“A crew chief in that seat would have warned the pilots to turn and descend immediately.” 

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Comments

Rocco

I don't think Colonel Joe has identified the crew positions correctly. He stated that the pilot was Staff Sgt. Ryan O’Hara. That rank would make him the crew chief, not the pilot. He is correct that NVG's "result in a sort of ‘tunnel vision’." That is a gross understatement. NVG's result in considerable limiting of the peripheral vision one would need to see the bright landing lights of the jet, and you wouldn't need NVG's to see those landing lights. Given all of that, does anyone really think that it is safe to have helicopters flying at 200 feet while jet traffic is flying the same space at 325 feet, a separation of 125 feet? That is insane!

James

So these people were flying a multimillion dollar chopper with tunnel vision through the flight path of a Very busy airport and NOT ONE of them thought to use their own eyes! Kind of like closing your eyes and sticking your head into a lions cage! Really?! My BS alarm is ringing off the wall!!!

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